Abstract-The paper gives a comprehensive presentation of the broad and still developing area of risk-averse decision making in the stochastic linear-quadratic class of multiperson noncooperative differential games and/or distributed controls. The fundamental set of design principles is developed for self-directed decision makers, who are imitatively cautious and privately capable of incorporating summary performancemeasure statistics into their distributed output-feedback Nash decision policies for competitive interactions and engagements.
I. INTRODUCTION
In noncooperative stochastic games and distributed controls, there are more than two capable decision makers who optimize different goals and utilities. Each decision maker wishes to influence to his advantage a shared interaction process by exerting his control decisions. To the best knowledge of the authors, most studies, e.g., [1] and [2] have mainly concentrated on the selection of open and/or closedloop Nash strategy equilibria in accordance of expected utilities under the structural constraints of linear system dynamics, quadratic cost functionals, and additive independent white Gaussian noises corrupting the system dynamics and measurements. Very little work, if any, has been published on the subject of higher-order assessment of performance uncertainty and risks beyond expected performance.
For this reason attention in the research investigation that follows, is directed primarily towards a linear-quadratic class of noncooperative stochastic games and/or distributed controls, which in turn has linear system dynamics, quadratic rewards and/or costs and independent white zero-mean Gaussian noises additively corrupting the system dynamics and output measurements. Notice that, under these conditions, the quadratic rewards or costs are random variables with the generalized chi-squared probability distributions. If a measure of uncertainty such as the variance of the possible rewards or costs was used in addition to the expected reward or costs, the decision makers should be able to correctly order preferences for alternatives. This claim seems plausible, but it is not always correct. Various investigations have indicated that any evaluation scheme based on just the expected reward or cost and reward/cost variance would necessarily imply indifference between some courses of action; therefore, no criterion based solely on the two attributes of means and variances can correctly represent their preferences. See [3] and [4] for further details.
The present research contributions include significant extensions of the existing results [5] toward some completely unexplored areas as such: i) the design of distributed filtering via private observations for self-directed decision makers and/or autonomous controllers with distributed noisy information structures about the uncertain interaction process; ii) an efficiently computational procedure for all the mathematical statistics associated with the generalized chi-squared rewards/costs when respective mean-risk aware utilities are formed; and iii) the synthesis of distributed risk-sensitive decision policies with output feedback for distributed noncooperative solutions of Nash type that now guarantee performance robustness with certainty much stronger than a stochastically averaging measure of performance.
II. PERFORMANCE-MEASURE STATISTICS
In this section, some preliminaries are in order. Some spaces of random variables and stochastic processes are introduced:
|| (t)|| 2 dt} < ∞}. As for a model specification, a noncooperative stochastic game or distributed control problem is considered with a set N {1, 2, . . . , N } of self-directed decision makers, who are risk aversive and controlling decision policies u 1 , . . . , u N . The length of horizon, on which the interaction dynamics evolve, is specified by [t 0 , t f ]. The interaction process together with environmental uncertainty is governed by the controlled stochastic differential equation modeled on
where the continuous coefficients
, and G ∈ C([t 0 , t f ]; R n×p ) are deterministic matrix-valued functions. The initial interaction state at time t = t 0 , x(t 0 ) x 0 ∈ R n is fixed. Practical situations, where self-autonomy is possible require that each decision maker be able to possess the common knowledge of the parameters associated with the noncooperative interactions (1) . Viewed from the mutual influence of one decision maker to those of others, selfautonomy preferred by decision maker i and i ∈ N is therefore approximated by a surrogate model with
from which each decision maker i can presumably observe a noise corrupted version of all best responses N j=1,j =i B j (t)u j (t) from the immediate neighbors. More specifically, the private observations are locally available
Recall that decision maker i is assumed to act purely on the basis of his own information. It is now necessary to specify the set of admissible feedback policies, 
is the performance measure with a generalized chi-squared random variable
where the design parameters 
In general, the conditional density 
Henceforth, to look for an optimal control and/or decision policy u i (t) of the form (10), it is only required that
Given the linear-quadratic properties of the surrogate system (2)-(9), the search for an optimal feedback solution is productively restricted to a linear time-varying feedback policy generated from the locally accessible statex i (t) by
with
an admissible feedback form whose further defining properties will be stated shortly.
For the admissible pair (t 0 , x i 0 ), the a-priori knowledge about neighboring disturbances u −i (·) and the admissible feedback policy (11), the aggregation of the dynamics (5) and (8) associated with decision maker i is described by the controlled stochastic differential equation having
and the performance measure (9) is rewritten as follows
where the aggregate stationary Wiener process noise w
with the correlation of independent increments defined as
and the aggregate system coefficients and state variables are given by
In the sequel, moving from the background of the generalized chi-squared random performance (13), one productive step involved in extracting information from complex behavior of (13) is modeling and management of all the mathematical statistics (also known as semi-invariants) associated with it. To this end, the results that follow highlight the rather crucial role played by the endeavor of extracting higher-order statistics pertaining to random distributions of (13).
Theorem 1: Cumulant-Generating Function. Let the states z i (·) of the coupling constraint dynamics (12) subject to the performance measure (13) be associated with risk-averse decision maker i. Further, let initial states z i (τ ) ≡ z i τ and τ ∈ [t 0 , t f ] and moment-generating functions with risk sensitive parameter θ i be denoted by
Then, the cumulant-generating function is quadratic affine
where the backward-in-time scalar valued υ i τ, θ i satisfies
whereas the backward-in-time matrix valued
Proof: The proof requires immediate results [6] . Specifically, a MacLaurin series expansion of the cumulant-generating function (16) is employed to infer behaviors regarding probabilistic distributions of (13) through the knowledge representation of the mathematical statistics
where
are performancemeasure statistics available at risk-averse decision maker i
For notational convenience, the change of variables
is introduced so that the next result will provide an effective and accurate capability for forecasting all the higher-order characteristics associated with performance uncertainty (13). Theorem 2: Performance-Measure Statistics. Let (A, B i ) and (A, C i ) associated with the coupling constraint (12) and the goal function (13) be uniformly stabilizable and detectable. For k i ∈ N, the k i th performancemeasure statistic of (13) concerned by risk-averse decision maker i and i ∈ N is given by
where the supporting variables {H 
and
and, finally,
whereby the terminal-value conditions
Refer to [6] for the analytical proof.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENTS
In the context of risk-averse decision making, cautious decision makers who realize performance risk akin to a costly preference for certainty will have to leverage higherorder statistics of the probability distribution (13) for optimizing risk-averse decisions. For such a problem it is important to have a compact statement of the risk-averse decision and control optimization so as to aid mathematical manipulations. Precisely, one may think of the k ituple state variables
r (·) with the right members satisfying the dynamics (24)-(28) are defined on [t 0 , t f ]. In the remainder of the development, the convenient mappings are introduced as
where the rules of action are given by
The product mappings that follow are necessary for a compact formulation; for example
where the corresponding notations
Thus, the dynamical equations (24)-(28) can be rewritten as
where the k i -tuple terminal-value conditions H 
An obvious fact about the private set of design freedom
with µ i 1 > 0 is that risk sensitivity entails the lack of certainty equivalence, in the sense that any performance index formed only by the first statistic of (13) does not lead to optimal decisions. In addition, it is important to recognized that this finite set of custom weights is quite different from those of infinite sets of series expansion coefficients as in [7] , [8] , [9] , just to name a few.
On
f ;µ i the performance index with mean-risk considerations is subsequently defined as follows. 
where additional design freedom µ i r 's utilized by cautious and defensive decision maker i are tailored to meet different levels of performance-based reliability requirements, e.g., mean, variance, anti-symmetry, heavy tails of the reward/cost density (13), etc., pertaining to closed-loop performance uncertainties and whereas the supporting solutions {H The technical challenge faced by cautious decision maker i and i ∈ N is that his mean-risk aware performance index (32) depends on the observable policies from neighboring decision makers u −i . The basic question he faces is whether or not a sort of noncooperative equilibrium or Nash solution is possible at all. Defensive decision maker i's rationale for choosing K i * is to force his neighbors to hold u −i * , so as to secure himself the Nash payoff. Thus, it is precisely in this sense that a Nash solution is risk-averse by nature. 
Now, the objective of cautious decision maker i is to minimize (32) over
f ;µ i and subject to the neighboring feedback Nash policies u with µ i 1 > 0, the decision optimization problem defined by min
is subject to the dynamical equations (29)- (31) on
In conformity with the dynamic programming approach, the terminal time and
Thus, the value function of (34) now depends on the parameterization of terminal-value conditions.
Definition 5:
;µ i is empty. Some candidates for the value function are also constructed with the help of the concept of reachable set.
Definition 6: Reachable Sets. Let a reachable set of decision maker i be defined by
Formally, it can be shown that the value function associated with decision maker i is satisfying partial differential equation (e.g., Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation) at interior points of Q i , at which it is differentiable.
Similar to that of [10] and hence is omitted. Finally, the sufficient condition used to verify a feedback Nash strategy for cautious and defensive decision maker i and i ∈ N is given next.
f ;µ i with the corresponding tra-
then, K i * is a feedback Nash strategy in
(37) Proof: The proof follows the same manner as [10] .
IV. DISTRIBUTED RISK-AVERSE DECISION STRATEGIES
To this end, the initial state z i 0 is recognized to contribute linearly and quadratically to the mean-risk performance index (32). Henceforth, it is beneficial to infer that a candidate function for the value function is expected to take the form Taking the gradient with respect to K i of the expression within the bracket of (40) yields the necessary conditions for an extremum of (32) on [t 0 , ε] where I
